Cantarell Update & Production Projection

On February 7, 2008 the respected oil and gas industry trade magazine Oil and Gas Journal published an update on the production from Mexico's largest oil fields. Ironically, this comes two years and a day from the original Wall Street Journal article (2/6/06) heralding the pending decline of the world's second largest oil field - Cantarell, located in Mexico.

The data for the Oil and Gas Journal article was reportedly sourced from El Financero newspaper. Although the discussion in the article hops back and forth between big Mexican oil fields, the bottom-line is that the article contains many useful "numbers", including some new information on the expected decline characteristics of Cantarell.

Quoting the article, "According to Sener, the 2007 - 16 Crude Oil Market Outlook prepared by the Energy Information System of the Energy Secretariat, in any scenario - high or low - Cantarell's production will average 917,000 - 921,000 b/d during 2006-16, with an average annual decline of 14.1 %."

This is the first I've seen of a quoted, long-term decline rate estimate for Cantarell, and given the initial production rate, one can use that decline rate to derive a production projection. I was encouraged to do so given the quoted "average rate" for an 11 year period (an average rate being non-sensical in this case, and thus a tip off for further study needed). Also, just yesterday I gave one of my sons the classic book, "How to Lie with Statistics" (for defensive purposes only, I might add), so the dangers in "averages" were fresh on my mind.

So, given the quoted 14.1% annual decline rate and using an initial production rate of 1.9 million barrels per day going into 2006, the following production projection was derived:

Cantarell Field - Mexico
Initial Rate (BO/D, beginning of 2006):		1900000	Note 1
Decline Rate:		14.1%	Note 2
Avg Production Rate, 2006 - 2016:		923,026	Note 2
	Oil Flowrate	Oil Flowrate	Oil Production
YEAR	(beginning of year)	(end of year)	(annual)
	(BO/D)	(BO/D)	(BO)
2006	1,900,000	1,632,100	643,440,753
2007	1,632,100	1,401,974	552,715,607
2008	1,401,974	1,204,296	474,782,706
2009	1,204,296	1,034,490	407,838,345
2010	1,034,490	888,627	350,333,138
2011	888,627	763,330	300,936,166
2012	763,330	655,701	258,504,166
2013	655,701	563,247	222,055,079
2014	563,247	483,829	190,745,313
2015	483,829	415,609	163,850,224
2016	415,609	357,008	140,747,342
Note 1: Cantarell said to be producing "about 2 MMBO/D" at EOY
2005; later production said to have declined by 100,000 BO/D
in 2005. Cantarell had been limited for years at rate of
2 MMBO/D (by the production facilities) so a 1.9 MMBO/D
initial rate going into 2006 appears to make sense, and when the
quoted decline rate is applied, the stated "average" is obtained.
Note 2: Decline rate (14.1 %) and avg. of "917 - 921,000 BO/D from
2006 - 2016" obtained from OGJ 2/7/08 article, in turn
quoting Sener & El Financero newspaper.

A couple of observations:

1. The production projection appears valid as it tends to agree (within reason) with the quoted "average" production rate from 2006 - 2016 of 917,000 - 921,000, namely the cumulative production over that time, divided by eleven years and by 365 days per year - yields 923,026 BO/D. As previously mentioned, an "average" is a fairly useless statistic in this case, except for validation purposes.
2. Note that by the end of 2009, the production rate is down to HALF of what it was in the beginning of 2005! This is not abnormal; it is simply the effect of continuous production decline, which is common in all oil fields, eventually.
3. Apparently Cantarell's production will only be about 350,000 barrels per day by the end of 2016, thus it will have dropped 1,650,000 barrels per day from 2005 (an overall 82.5 % decline). This is the kind of decline that has some of us concerned about Peak Oil, and how quickly we need to initiate conservation efforts and develop alternatives, while we continue to wisely and rapidly develop fossil hydrocarbon and nuclear resources.
   

Peak Oil: Why is it so difficult to explain/understand?

After several years of partial success in explaining the physics-based phenomenon sometimes known as “Peak Oil”, this author has come to one conclusion: Peak Oil is difficult to explain, and it is difficult for most people to understand.

Now, some folks make the conscious choice to avoid considering a concept like Peak Oil because it might imply future hardship or a change in lifestyle, and they’d rather dwell on “positive” matters. Others would consider the acceptance of Peak Oil to be defeatist – ie, a surrender of man’s great ingenuity and/or his ability control his own destiny. Make no mistake about it, this author has a high regard for the power of positive thinking, for man’s ingenuity and for his ability to help influence his destiny.

For others, the difficulty with Peak Oil might be a subconscious one. Theories such as “cognitive dissonance” and “consensus trance” have been advanced, and these are likely manifestations of what is sometimes referred to as “crowd behavior”.

But for this exercise, let’s set aside these willful and subconscious roadblocks.

So, why do rational, intelligent, objective people have a hard time with this concept?

Well, a good guess might be that we are barraged - on a daily basis - with volumes of commentaries, data and unintelligible statistics:

• “Oil inventories are down this week.”
• “OPEC is increasing production by 500,000 barrels per day.”
• “There are trillions of barrels of tar sands around the world.”
• “They just found a new, 8 billion barrel field in Brazil.”

Who has the necessary time to sort through it all, and have any chance of understanding? Who has the time to continually determine what's good data, what's bad data, or what's skewed data? Or, what's "big" (important) and what's "little" (not important) in terms of scale? What's the maximum rate that can be produced from a new discovery? How long will it take to drill all the wells and get the infrastructure in place? Then how quickly can the field be depleted?

Without continuous study, it all becomes a fog. And sometimes even WITH continuous study, it is still foggy! As a result, most of us resort to: “Just tell me the answer! And tell me something good!”

The term “Peak Oil” is really a shorthand. It is an abbreviation for “peak production rate” or “maximum worldwide production rate”. Peak Oil is a manifestation of the physics of the depletion of a finite resource. And physics indicates that over the life of a group of all the fields in a country - or in the world - there is a maximum rate that can be achieved, and that rate occurs when roughly half of the RESERVES are depleted.

Currently, the average rate of oil consumption/production is around 85 million barrels per day, and many believe that there is little current "surplus capacity". Some believe that Peak Oil may be 80 – 85 million barrels per day, ie we are “already there”. Others believe that the world may be able to achieve 100 million barrels per day by 2011 or so. And the IEA has forecasts that indicate that it will be possible to produce as much as 120 million barrels per day in 2030!

But what if the world population grows, developing nations develop, and 2.4 billion Chinese and Indians just want to use a little more oil? Well, if the demand is 110 million barrels per day, and the world can only produce 100 million barrels per day, then the price will go up until the demand abates. And if worldwide economic growth is proportional to the rate of growth in energy consumption (as it has been since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution), then if we can’t grow energy consumption, we’ve got a problem with growing the economy!

To make matters worse, after the maximum oil production rate (Peak Oil) is reached, then the rate begins to decline - at least within a few years! (Hirsch's recent work with respect to "plateaus" is not encouraging.) So, post-Peak Oil, the economy not only can't continue to grow, but it must contract – IF economic growth is proportional to growth in energy usage (as it has been in the past).

So far we’ve talked about production RATE. Now let’s cover one other concept: RESERVES. RESERVES are "how much oil that there is left in the ground, which can be gotten out".

Once again, understanding RATE and RESERVES are the keys to understanding Peak Oil:

• RATE (in our context) is the maximum rate of oil production for a group of fields, or for the world.
• RESERVES are how much oil that is in the ground that can be ultimately be produced (for this analysis we won’t even differentiate between oil types, ie tar sands v. light oil, or different categories of reserves, based on risk).

So, many folks believe that the world was endowed with around 2 trillion barrels of conventional, recoverable oil. So the RESERVES for the world were 2 trillion barrels before any oil was produced. Most folks think we have produced about 1 trillion barrels of oil. So, that would leave current RESERVES of 1 trillion barrels.

Now, that’s a lot of oil! Why all the fuss? Well, here’s the punchline, and it has as much to do with the lack of cognition of Peak Oil as anything:

The maximum production RATE for a given field or group of fields in not arbitrary! In other words, it can’t just be anything you want it to be! For instance, if a field has RESERVES of say 10 million barrels, the maximum RATE might be several thousand barrels per day, but it could never be 1 million barrels per day.

Why? OK, here is the key take-away:

Due to the physics of the flow of oil through rock, a field’s (or a country’s, or the world’s) maximum oil production RATE is not arbitrary but is dependent on the RESERVES’:

• SIZE (how big is the field in terms of area and thickness?)
• AGE (is the field newly discovered/produced, or is has it been producing for 40 years?)
• QUALITY (how well does the oil flow through the rock?)

Examples:

• All of the world’s largest oil fields – Ghawar, Cantarell, Burgan and Daquing - have excellent SIZE and excellent QUALITY ... but their AGE is old! Hence, all of these (except possibly Ghawar) are in decline (their RATE is declining each day).
• The Athabasca tar sands, on the other hand, have excellent SIZE, they are essentially “new” in AGE (relatively little compared to the RESERVES has been produced so far), but they have the very poorest QUALITY – the oil is so thick it won’t flow and must be melted with heat, dissolved with solvents or mined.

Most who take the “no Peak Oil” (or no Peak Oil until 2030 and then an “undulating plateau”) side of the debate speak of RESERVES. They don’t often address the difficult topic of trying to explain where the RATE will come from.

Recently this author attended a trade conference concerning “unconventional resources”. “Unconventional resources” is another way of saying “difficult to produce at a high rate, but prevalent in a given area”. For the most part, it’s what we’re left with, especially in the United States. So, a representative from IHS (who owns CERA) gave a talk and presented, among other things, maps showing trillions of barrels – worldwide – of bitumen, tar sands and heavy oil. Afterwards he smugly said, “WELL, I guess there are no supporters of PEAK OIL in this room!”

With respect to oil production RATE (which is what Peak Oil is all about), he may as well have been showing a map of coal resources.

What he didn’t explain was the fact that Canada, despite having huge tar sands RESERVES of 188 billion barrels (or call it a trillion barrels, it really doesn’t matter), is currently producing oil from those tar sands at a RATE of about 1.1 million barrels per day. And this after a Herculean effort and tens of billions of dollars invested!

The Canadian tar sands producers have a roadmap for increasing the production RATE from those huge RESERVES to a total of ... 3 million barrels per day, by 2015! That’s an increase of only another 1.9 million barrels per day, but over 7 years, and with additional tens of billions of dollars injected!

So, that huge amount of RESERVES is limited in RATE because it is of the poorest QUALITY.

To put this in perspective and show why it is important - why Peak Oil is important - take a look at the second largest field in the world, Cantarell, in Mexico. In early 2006, PEMEX announced that Cantarell Field was about to go into decline, for the first time ever. In fact, they projected that this field that produced 2 million barrels per day of Mexico’s total 3.4 million barrels per day (end of 2005) would be down to between 1.5 and 0.5 million barrels per day by the end of 2008! Now, at the end of 2007, it is already down to 1.3 – 1.5 million barrel per day! So, if it finishes 2008 at 800,000 barrels per day, that is a loss of 1.2 million barrels per day, over just 2 years.

Compare this with the Canadian tar sands production increase of only 1.9 million barrels per day over 7 years - after a huge incremental effort. Factor in the depletion going on in most every field around the world – and you have an idea of the problem at hand, and a better understanding of Peak Oil. Among other things, huge RESERVES of poor QUALITY oil are not going to be able to provide the RATE of production necessary to stem the declines from the giant high QUALITY fields that are now old in AGE, much less continue to increase our total RATE.

In summary, Peak Oil is about RATE. And RATE is dependent on the SIZE, AGE and QUALITY of the RESERVES.

Oil Discoveries by Year

Shown above is a bar chart displaying how "many" oil reserves (in billion barrels or gigabarrels) were discovered/booked on an annual basis, from 1930 until 2005. This simple graph is really what drives "Peak Oil". Namely, the amount of new oil that we discover each year "peaked" in the 1960's. Or put another way, we are not finding nearly as much oil now as we were in the 1960's. This despite major technological advances such as 3D seismic, horizontal drilling, etc. Interesting note: both 3D seismic and horizontal drilling are technologies that help us find or develop things that we couldn't find or develop otherwise - there's a message there.

Now realize that when we talk about the amount of oil discovered each year, we are talking about RESERVES. "Peak Oil" is really about the worldwide, maximum production RATE. But the maximum production RATE is reached ("Peak Oil") sometime in the future, following the peak in the discoveries. In other words, when you discover a field, it takes a years before you get it producing its first oil, then fully develop it, etc. Then at some point you have drilled all the infill and stepout wells you can in that field - and then the production begins to decline.

Note that the world currently consumes about 85 million barrels of oil per day. So, if we found 5 billion barrels in 2005, that would last an incremental ... 60 days. Now you are getting the picture. 5 billion barrels seems like a lot of oil - but not when you consume 85 million barrels per day. The recent 8 billion barrel, deepwater discovery in Brazil is wonderful, but we use that much oil in 94 days. It's that "SCALE" thing.

ASPO 10/07 - MP's Comments

Folks:

I guess I first started sending out these missives about two years ago, in late 2005. Some of you no doubt thought that I had fallen off my rocker. Well, that is probably true, but another reality is that the oil situation continues to unfold about as expected. Unfortunately.

Waxing a bit nostalgic, I have been studying oil and gas supply since the price plunge of the mid-1980's, when we started having "supply side" speakers at the API-Houston Chapter. I remember when Enserch found some arcane legal code with which to petition Reagan, which would absolutely force him to "do something." And when Lloyd Bentsen said 50% imports was a "peril point" and we'd "do something" if it ever got that high. (was about 35% imports then, around 65% now) Earlier, in the 1960's or 1970's a partner of mine witnessed one of the last really knowledgeable RRC Commissioners, Bill Murray, say, "You get a chance to manage a surplus, or you will have to manage a shortage." Really profound words. And of course, prophetic.

Well, no one wanted to manage the temporary surplus of the 1980's, so a huge number of rigs were cut-up or shipped away or rusted down (we had 4500 at one time; now after Herculean efforts, only slightly over 2000). The smart people became lawyers and MBA's. If I remember correctly, well over 500,000 jobs were lost in our industry. No one really cared, as John Q. Public generally loves to hate "oil companies" and anyone involved in them. Cheap gasoline was what everyone wanted, and that is what they got - for a while. Anything else (like restraining production just a little, an oil import fee, etc.) would have been price-fixing or "pandering to big oil". To wit, the recent attack on Aubrey McClendon and Chesapeake over their shutting in just a bit of production.

Interestingly, I remember my father (38 years at Shell Oil) mentioning King Hubbert one time. As a teenager, though, I didn't pay much attention. Hubbert worked in the same facility as my dad, in the 1950's. My brother (16 years older than I am) swears he remembers Hubbert coming over for dinner once or twice, probably before I was born. Dad was chairman of the API-Houston Chapter at that time, and I have his bound monograph of the papers given in 1956, including the original Hubbert article. He obviously was interested in it, as he took the time to update the curve - in pencil - sometime in the 1970's.

It has been a busy couple of years, and the last few months have been exceptionally busy for me. I've been doing my level best to try to stem the tide of Peak Oil by trying to find more of the stuff! (Well, gas anyway.) Meanwhile I serve on the board of a non-profit which is documenting "wild plants" in Texas and the surrounding areas ( www.usefulwildplants.org ). We are currently trying to raise additional funds to accelerate the project, which will serve as a catalyst for sustainable energy, food, chemical and fiber efforts, via utilization of "wild" plants. Now, as it turns out, just in time for Peak Oil. (Hopefully.)

A few weeks ago, Oct 17 - 19, I attended the Association for the Study of Peak Oil's (ASPO's) USA convention, held at the Hilton of the Americas in downtown Houston. This group was founded a number of years ago by Colin Campbell, among others. Campbell was one of the first "Paul Reveres" in the recent iteration of concern over Peak Oil. He wrote the book The Coming Oil Crisis ... in 1988. During that time of oil and gas surpluses this type of talk was regarded by many as lunacy. Even in the 2000 - 2003, Peak Oil was thought by most in the industry (who had even heard of it - which were few) to be the domain of the "lunatic fringe", pessimists, Chicken Little's. The prevailing wisdom was that the Saudis had vast, shut-in, 10,000 BO/D wells that they could crank on any time, and huge, wonderful areas to explore. Most of the misunderstanding arose (and still does) over "big versus little" (ie, scale), and RATE versus RESERVES.

Peak Oil being far from the lunatic fringe realm any more, the following groups had speakers at the ASPO conference:

City of Houston: Sponsor, and Mayor Bill White spoke at lunch.

University of Houston - sponsored and supplied a futurist

Merrill Lynch - Tom Petrie, Vice Chairman - spoke

Jeffries, Randall & Dewey - spoke

Colorado Geologic Survey - excellent presentation on India, China, mineral supply and demand by Vince Matthews, director (ex - UPRC)

SAIC - Bob Hirsch - spoke

Canadian Geologic Survey - spoke - excellent graphs

Dept of Homeland Security - Scott Pugh, ret. Navy sub commander - spoke

Tom Whipple - ex-CIA analyst and editor of the Falls Church News Press (Virginia)

Department of Energy - Oregon - spoke

Austin Energy

Toyota Motor Sales USA

T. Boone Pickens

Henry Groppe - Groppe, Long, Littell

Bob Hirsch, who, in 2005, authored the landmark, revelatory study for the DOE, was one of the speakers I was looking forward to hear at the ASPO conference. He didn't disappoint - but only made my stomach grumble a bit more. Overall, there were quite a number of really excellent presentations. All are available on the ASPO website:

http://www.aspousa.org/proceedings/houston/

I highly recommend you download and view the presentations by:

• Bob Hirsch

• Vince Matthews - Director of the Colorado Geological Survey

• Tom Petrie

• Stuart Staniford/Euan Mearns - www.oildrum.com - study of Ghawar

The "Key Take-Aways" from my notes are attached. Included in those notes are some of Hirsch's slides.

My observations and comments:

• The peak in oil production might have occurred in late 2005, and most in this group believe it will certainly happen prior to 2011 - 2012. If it hasn't occurred, my bet would be 2008, as I have believed since 2001 or so.
  
• It sure looks like Saudi has produced about half of its recoverable oil, meaning it is at or near peak, in turn meaning the world is at or near peak.
• Cantarell (second largest field in the world, in Mexico) peaked in 2004 as I previously communicated to you, and is down from 2 MMBO/D (late 2005) to 1.6 MMBO/D today. It is on a trajectory near to the "worst case" scenario, as described by Pemex in early 2005, and later confirmed by the WSJ.
• Oil Export Withholding (Hirsch) seems quite likely, and was a new one to me. Means things will happen even faster.
• Jeffrey Brown's "Export Land Model" is similar, but is a “physics” rather than an economic/geopolitical phenomenon. Namely, when consumption in exporting nations is increasing in a low, but compounding fashion (as it is), and production begins decreasing in a compounding fashion, then those nations soon have NONE to export - much sooner than if they hadn't been growing their consumption. To wit: Indonesia, UK - both exporters until very recently.
• GDP will drop about like the oil rate will decline - and continuously, year over year. (Hirsch)
• Rationing of gas and diesel are in our near (0 - 3 years) future.
• Inflation is far understated, and will rear its head soon. And at a time when the economy is deteriorating.
• There could be a series of "head fakes", ie prices drop for a time, due to new Rockies Express pipeline, LNG, Independence Hub online - or due to a rapid run-up in price causing demand destruction (for a short while) (Petrie)
• There is no simplistic "smoking gun, no reason" for Peak Oil, hence the public and the media can't "get it". So, the politicians won’t get it. (Whipple)
• Not yet a critical mass to move people and politicians.(Whipple)
• Behavior is not likely to change until there is a pronounced shortage at the pumps, hoarding.(Whipple)
• Politicians, in general have a "Don't have enough? Well, just get more." attitude.
• Although not related to Peak Oil, many minerals are now in short supply, controlled by foreign govts, either in our country or theirs. (Matthews)
• Still no battery or electricity storage solution for plug-in hybrids or pure electric vehicles.

Meanwhile:

• a huge real estate bust (and all that it entails) is in the early stages, due to a massive overextension of credit
• many of our financial institutions are being shaken to the core (Merrill, Citi, Countrywide, WaMu)
• oil ironically broke $90 the Thursday evening of the conference, now it is nearing $100.
• gold has been spiking, the dollar has been plummetting
• $250/bbl strike price calls are now available in 2010, $200 calls evidently have active trading in 12/08.
• the IEA just issued a really gloomy forecast, two weeks ago.

On the brighter side, though, is that old adage about the Chinese word for "chaos" being the same as for "opportunity".

More later,

MP

ASPO 10/07 - MP's Notes - Key Take-Aways

ASPO (Association for the Study of Peak Oil)
Annual USA Meeting, 10/17-10/19, Hilton of the Americas, Houston, TX
Sponsored by City of Houston, U of H

MP’s Notes - Key Take-Aways

Bob Hirsch, SAIC

• MP: Author of landmark study for DOE/NETL in 2004, which started being found in odd places on the internet in early 2005.
• MP: Gist of Bob’s objective, 92 page paper from 2004 is that peak oil will occur, and it may be occur-ing, and that efforts to transition primarily transportation (but other things, as well, like the economy) take a finite amount of time, are not instantaneous. For instance, in 20 years, can convert fairly painlessly, in 5 years much pain to world economy. If wait (to take SERIOUS, pro-active actions) until AFTER peak - severe problems, dislocations!
• MP: Initially, in 2/05, and for a good while thereafter, the paper was only found on a high school website in Chula Vista, CA
• MP: Later that year World Oil (a very conservative trade journal) ran two Hirsch articles, subsets of his study.
• Has been working on extending his study, updating effects, peaking profile. (MP: the few pundits to Peak Oil (CERA) seem to always site an “undulating plateau” – sounds so nice, and you often see those two words together. Jim Kunstler told me when I asked that they are “mellifluous” together.)
• Found that the % drop in world GDP divided by the % drop in oil supply are about “1”, at least order of magnitude. Say ½ to 2. 10 is too high, 0.1 is too low. So, when world oil takes on a decline after the “plateau”, however wide, then the GDP drop in the world will likely mirror the oil decline rate.
• Used 73 embargo and 79 crisis as models, among other things.
• From USG’s “Oilshockwave” Scenario (Robert Gates), a 4% shortfall in oil led to $160/bbl, and led to a 4% drop in GDP.
• Giant oilfield decline rates
• Prudhoe produced at pipeline max of 1.5 – 1.6 MMBO/D beginning in 1982, started declining in 1988.
• See 8 – 16 % initial decline (just past peak) in major field (MP: wow)
• US production had very little plateau (MP: remember 10MMBO/D in 1970, only doing about half that now. All the new technology (3D, horizontal drilling, etc) didn’t do much for even the decline rate.
• Europe had a 6 yr plateau (but that plateau included 3% variations – “remember the impact of a 3% drop/lack of supply”
• NA had a sharp break then 3 % initial decline for 5 years. Remember, 3% for 5 years is 15% (he meant, think GDP drop)
• Campbell – 2010 - 11 peak, 4 years to 4% decline, then 2% decline
• Laherrerre – 2018 peak, 8 years to 4 % decline, then 2 % decline.
• Most all analysts come up with 2 – 5 % annual decline for some period of time, just after peaking. (MP: implications for GDP again)
• OEWS – something else he is studying
• In 1950, 85% of reserves controlled by major oil cos., 15 % NOC controlled
• Now: 10 % reserves control by majors, 90 % by NOC’s!
• Thesis: Oil exporters WILL reduce exports due to windfall! (Putin did a thesis on this, interestingly)
• Dwindling resource (MP: being exchanged for paper money of diminishing value)
• Consumption rising (MP: most exporting nations subsidize/insulate their populace so as to ameliorate them, stay in power)
• So, likelyhood of Oil Exporting Withholding”, or OEWS.
• So, the REALITY is even worse – “effective peaking” will occur prior to peaking due to physics. (MP: and this is without major geopolitical problems, just the normal ones that lead to OEWS)
• IEA watershed comments:
• “unsustainable”
• “doomed to failure”
• “peaking in 2012”
• but blame NOC’s – and have to wade through huge paper.
• Plateau analysis
• Best Case: 2-15 years, then 2- 5 % decline.
• Middle Case: sharp peak, then 2 – 5 % decline
• Worst Case: OEWS – early peak & worse than 2 – 5 %

Bottom-line: Need an immediate, crash program of conservation, demand mitigation.

Comments & answers to questions by Hirsch after Skrebowski spoke:

• “Don’t see how we can do without rationing of transportation fuels.”
• “Oil Shockwave exercise included supplies dropping 4 % for several years.”
• “Non-equilibrium economics (MP: are scary as hell) – Markets/Demand can’t change as fast as decline takes place.”
• “Futures market is looking to the past to determine the future – can be problematic at inflection points.”
• “Not good at predicting the future, less good at doing something about about it.”

Chris Skrebowski, Editor, Petroleum Review, London - “How close are we?”

• Best guess: 93 MMBO/D (v. 84 MMBO/D now) Peak in 2011/2012.
• Assumption changes give a bit higher peak RATE, but don’t shift DATE/Curve that much!

Tom Petrie (formerly Petrie Parkman, now Vice Chairman of Merrill Lynch)

• What does it take to offset natural declines?
• At 2 % decline, 8 MMBO/D
• At 5 %, 16 MMBO/D
• At 8 %, 24 MMBO/D
• Mentioned Putin’s papers on national patrimony
• Will price signals work? “OEWS” may be worse than expected.
• China about to exceed in total emissions.
• Russia-China have oil & gas linkages.
• Iran – Russia – helping Iran go nuclear
• China – Iran – crude oil deal
• India-Iran-Pakistan – gas pipeline
• Book: The Black Swan – The Impact of the Highly Improbable
• “Capital Markets and Energy M&A are in “remarkable denial” – still view Peak Oil as improbable.”
• “2nd, 3rd order consequences”
• Turkey analogy – had a great life, lots of good food, got fat – until the day before Thanksgiving. Using as an analogy.
• “Markets are beginning to embrace Peak Oil.”
• “May get a “head fake” in 6 -12 month when Rockies Express, LNG, Independence Hub bring major gas to market – BS, FS at risk.
• “Series of Petro-Driven “Black Swan” events.”
• “Will have been perceived as highly improbable, but in retrospect they were highly predictable.”
• 10 of 14 LNG producers are OPEC countries.
• “Don’t think historical economic behavior patterns will have predictive utility.”
• “Inflation is FAR UNDERSTATED.”
• “Problem with government/politicians – This is too real a problem to try to address!”
• “Our system is designed to dumb-down things like this.”
• CNBC asks: “What price to change behavior?”
• “$30 - $88 is creating “cumulative drag” on the economyZ”
• “$90 - $120/BBL will start to see change.”
• “Europe less susceptible to adjustments because they have been taxing oil, seeing higher prices for a long time, increase will be smaller, percentage-wise.”
• “Too much noise in financial systems to know what needs to be done strategically.” (MP: ie need to figure out what needs to be done with something other than price movements alone.)
• “Abandoning economic growth?” POSSIBLE! (MP: wow, same Hubbert conclusion, but once again startling, coming from Petrie & Merrill Lynch)
• “We are at a major historical inflection point.” “For many – pain. For the anticipatory – an opportunity.”
• “If we jump to $120 quickly, demand elasticity will likely be triggered and price may drop to $45 for a short period.”

Tom Whipple - “Peak Oil and the Media”

• Ex-CIA analyst, is often quoted in the Falls Church, VA paper, is Editor of Peak Oil News and Peak Oil Review. His summaries are found on www.energybulletin.net (a site I frequent), weekly.
• Why is Peak Oil not in the Mainstream Media (MSM)?
• “Never heard about it.”
• “Nonsense – there is plenty.”
• “No gloomy news – people don’t like that.”

His take:

• There is no “smoking gun, no reason”. (MP: IMO, this is unfortunate but is also a reflection of the populace and TV-induced non-thought. This is an issue that requires pro-activity and lead time to prevent catastrophy. It appears that it is unlikely that major action will be taken before it is too late (and it may already be, but any time we wait only worsens the impact).
• GAO, NPC studies which came out got close to zero MSM attention – but they were thick, seemingly confusing studies with nothing spectacular in their conclusions.
• “Only MSM can bring widespread attention.”
• Coverage is indeed changing/increasing slowly, scattered stories.
• Not yet a critical mass to move people and the government.
• 10/17/07 article about $88 oil in NYT – had EVERYTHING BUT Peak Oil as a possible explanation. Some hints – spare capacity, harder to bring oil to market.
• He thinks we are 80% there in terms of MSM getting it.
• However, “only a pronounced shortage at the pumps may help explain it, price alone won’t do it.”

Vince Matthews, Director, Colorado Geological Survey (ex-UPR)
Oil, Minerals and The China Syndrome

• Nuclear/Uranium
• In US, last nuclear plant built in 1996 (and it was started in the 1970’s)
• World using 180 MM# of Uranium per year.
• World only producing 100 – 110 MM# of Uranium per year.
• Uranium was $10 in 2003.
• Uranium increased to $130 in 2007!!! (below $100 now)
• US using 60 MM# Uranium per year
• US only producing 2 MM# of Uranium per year.
• Many of the US extraction industries ARE now foreign-owned.

Bottom-Lines:

• “Huge inflationary pressures are now built into the pipeline.”
• “Increasing shortages.”
• “Worry of a “Mine the West” mentality.”
• “Allegiance of the multi-nationals to the US?”

Stuart Staniford/Euan Mearns – Ghawar Field/Saudi Arabia
(Stuart and Euan are “editors” on The Oil Drum, frequent posters. Stuart has a Phd in Physics, MS in CS. Both have taken on the “reverse engineering” of Ghawar and other Saudi fields on a voluntary basis, due to their concern. Their work can be found on www.oildrum.com)

• Saudi produced 8.25 MMBO/D in 03 – 04, then increased that to 9 – 9.5, until early 2006, then the rate has been decreasing linearly (interesting) since then to 8.5, leading many to wonder if this is voluntary or forced due to decline. However, there have been several flat months recently. It will be interesting to see if they can substantially increase production, and hold it there. Should know by summer 2008.
• Ghawar produced 5 MMBO/D of the total, up through 2003 at least. It accounts for 1/3 of Saudi reserves, and 6% of global supply. Hence the focus on Ghawar.
• 5 major areas, from N to S: Ain Dar, Shedgum, Uthmaniyah, Hawiyah, Haradh.
• The perm and porosity decrease from N to S, 19%, 640 md in N, to 14%, 52 md in South.
• Hawiyah not developed until 70’s, 80’s, and Haradh not until 2006.

Bottom-Lines:

• Pre-nationalization EUR was 211 GB with 91 GB remaining.
• Saudi EUR jumped from 170 B to 260 B in 1987. Some of this was probably warranted, as a result of better information, reserve growth, new technology.
• Hubbert linearization of Crude + Condensate (with new production areas) shows about 200 GB EUR.
• Mearns: C + C + NGL: EUR 240 GB, can get rate to 11 MMBO/D, but still peak rate still occurs in 2011.
• Colin Campbell has said EUR 275 GB
• KSA has said OOIP around 700 GB. May be correct. KSA says 60 % RF, Stuart calculates 52% RF.
• Given cumulative production is 120 MMBO, and EUR is around 240 GB, then they are about half depleted. According to the physics, a rate decline could begin at any time, and likely on or before 2011.

Investing in Unconventional Fuels – M/C by Leslie Haines with Oil & Gas Investor mag.

Gentleman with Raymond James

• At $80 oil, $3.70 bushel corn (note, we sold our 3000 bu. in June at $2.75), ethanol still works.
• PV Solar become breakeven at $150/bbl
• PV has .05% of power market here, less than 1% in Germany (the world leader)
• Wind, Geothermal, Ethanol, Biodiesel – all economic now!
• PV had 23 % CAGR, last 10 yrs!
• MP note: Not a word on SC based ethanol!

Dick Vodra, CFP – Spire Investment Planners, McLean, VA


Two decision levels (relevant to Peak Oil):

• Investment decisions
• Life decisions

• “PO will likely cause disruption at all levels and new rules at all levels” (wow, nothing new to us, but strange from a mainstream CFP)
• Reduce personal debt
• Reduce risk exposure generally
• “... likely to create a world where transportation of all kinds is much more expensive ...”
• Support farmer’s markets
• Support local retail production
• Participate in community organizations
• Know your neighbors
• Support alternative transportation.

“... likely to affect availability of products and services. Repairing and reusing will become common again. Self-reliance will be more important.
Become and stay healthy
Learn new skills

Keith Behrens – Energy Capital Solutions (Dallas)

• Panda - $90 MM ethanol near Hereford, TX
• It quickly became evident that ethanol is currently underwater, reeling substantially, probably due to a rush to market with so many plants, lack of distribution, marketing, increase in corn prices (notwithstanding the controversial economics/proposition in the first place)
• 132 ethanol facilities now, 27 more under construction.
• Much supply, not much infrastructure.
• Ethanol price dropped 33% last yr, corn increased in price
• $0.50 /gal tax break with ethanol, so usually ethanol should be $0.50 above gas prices – not so now.
• Not a WORD on SC ethanol!

George Baker – Mexico Energy Intelligence

Big Mexican fields:

• KMZ
• Cantarell
• Chicontepec

Cantarell:

• Flat at 1 MMBO/D for 10 years
• Then in 2000 began injecting 1 BCF/D of N2, increased rate to 2 MMBO/D in 2005. (MP: Mexico total then 3.4 MMBO/D)
• In 2007: 1.5 – 1.6 MMBO/D
• In 2008: 0.8 MMBO/D
• In 2009: 0.6 MMBO/D

KMZ:

• $7 Billion, 10 years, 100 wells, H2S, CO2, heavy oil, FPSO used for production when infrastructure was already in place???

Chicontepec:

• Plan is from 2007 – 2016, to drill 10,692 development wells that each come on at around 150 BO/D, then decline to 50 BO/D!!! Impossible.
• Claiming deepwater, 400 MMCF/D, 2012 – but that is just the gas, oil will take much longer.

Bottom-Lines:

• Mexico Peaked in 2004.
• Acting like “business as usual.”
• KMZ, Chicontepec are suspect.
• Deepwater on Mexican side, need 80 companies working on it, not one.
• Cross-border fields may change government policy, or not? (MP: Draining them?)

David Hughes – Canadian Geological Survey – “Natural Gas and Coal: Some challenging facts.”
A series of nice, colorful graphs. In presentation available at link.

• Bottom-line: Unfortunately, not much help from Natural Gas, nor even coal.

Scott Pugh – “Nuclear Power: Pros, Cons, and the Efficiency Card”

• 2005 retired from Navy as a sub commander, joined Amory Lovins at the Rocky Mountain Institute as “Military Principal”, now works for Science and Technology Dept. of Homeland Security
• It would take 1000 – 2MW nuclear plants to run all our vehicles, cost $3-4 Billion, at 10/yr take 100 years, and we’d run out of fuel before we were finished.
• 12 companies are “talking about” applying for 27 plants, now.
• Utilities have small market caps compared to the cost of just one nuclear plant.
• Would take 7 – 10 years to build a plant today.

Roger Bezder – Co-Author, Hirsch Report, NETL

• DC to West Coast, recent discount ticket for $150. If fuel prices double, ticket would only have to got to $190, that is still a good deal.
• “Peak Oil ECONOMIC EFFECTS will have a larger impact (and a significant one) on aviation industry, rather than the cost of fuel relating to continuing to operate.” (MP: also supply shortfall, shortages, rationing he implies later, rather than price per se.)
• “Air traffic grows faster than GDP, and air traffic will SLOW faster than GDP.”
• “Model: Assume peaking in 2008, then oil declines 2 %.”
• Chronic excess capacity – chaos in industry and beyond.
• 100’s of billions of $ of stranded investment.
• Tourism, cities that depend on travel will suffer.
• AG, Healthcare, MFG, Emergency Services will have priority when fuel is in short supply.

Justin Ward – Toyota Motor Sales, USA – “Plug-in Hybrid Technology Update”

• Bottom-line/stumbling block: Batteries not ready for EV, PHEV
• Current Prius conversion batteries cost $15,000
• Don’t warranty that long
• Possible thermal management problems
• Diesels: “Post 2007 rules require thousand of dollars of tailpipe cleaunup to meet CARB (CA) specs – which are no longer just CA but many states.” (Mercedes-Benz)

John Kaufmann, Oregon Dept. of Energy – “Summary from the Portland Peak Oil Task Force”

• Sanctioned by the City Council
• Major tenets of their group:
• Peak Oil will happen – probably sooner rather than later.
• It will be a “Long Emergency”, not sudden, not over quickly.
• No Magic Bullet alternate supply alternatives.
• Good presentation, is available on link.

Roger Duncan, Deputy Director, Austin Energy – “The View from a Municipal Utility”

• Austin – no rate increase for 13 years – one is coming soon.
• Takes 20 years to replace a 500 MW coal plant with solar.
• Even with all the things they are doing in terms of conservation and alt energy in Austin, are not meeting load growth. Need new plants, costs are staggering.

Peter Bishop – Professor, U of H, “Houston after Peak Oil”, presentation online

• “Puncutated equilibrium” – one era after another.
• “Complexity of societyis a function of the energy it has.”
• “Up to now, had an increasing energy density.”
• “Transitions inevitably create problems.”
• Houston – 50 % energy/chemical economy today, was 85% in 1983
• Bottom-line (among other things):
• Society that goes fewer places.
• No internal combustion engines.
• Biodiesel trucks.